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INTRODUCTION
In 2001, in Legal Services Corporation v. Velazquez, the United States
Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional Congress' restriction
that had prevented legal services lawyers from challenging any wel-
fare laws or regulations in the course of representing individual cli-
ents seeking welfare benefits.' This case falls squarely within the
theme of this symposium-suing the government-because it chal-
lenged Congress' attempt to control the arguments that clients repre-
sented by legal services lawyers were able to raise in lawsuits against
the government. Velazquez is also relevant to this theme because it
was itself a lawsuit against the government, in which the Court tread
new ground in its discussion of how the "welfare challenge" restric-
tion at issue in the case was viewpoint discriminatory, and in its dis-
cussion of how that restriction violated the separation of powers by
depriving the courts of essential information.
The Velazquez Court did not address the constitutionality of a
whole host of other restrictions that the Gingrich Congress imposed
on legal services lawyers in 1996.2 These restrictions include bans on
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531 U.S. 533, 548-49 (2001). The Velazquez ruling, which has been discussed at length
elsewhere, will not be the focus of this article. See, e.g., Laura K. Abel & David S. Udell, If You
Gag the Lawyers Do You Choke the Courts? Some ImplicationsforJudges When Funding Restrictions Curb
Advocacy by Lawyers on Behalf of the Poor, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 873 (2002); Burt Neuborne &
David Udell, Legal Services Corporation v. Velazquez, CLEARINGHOUSE REV. (May-June 2001);
Robert L. Tsai, Conceptualizing Constitutional Litigation as Anti-Government Expression: A Speech-
Centered Themy of Court Access, 51 AM. U. L. RE\'. 835, 856-62 (2002).
2 The Supreme Court denied certiorari regarding the plaintiffs' challenge to a number of
the other restrictions. SeeVelazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 532 U.S. 903, 903 (2001).
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representing certain alien workers, representing clients in class action
litigation, claiming attorneys' fee awards, engaging in certain types of
representation before legislative and administrative bodies, and many
other important types of representation.3 Nor did it address the con-
stitutionality of similar restrictions that some state funders impose on
funding for civil legal services. As with the "welfare challenge" re-
striction, the remaining restrictions are relevant to the theme of this
symposium for two reasons: 1) they make it harder for low-income
people to obtain legal representation in lawsuits against the govern-
ment and in other civil proceedings; and 2) legal challenges to them
would entail suing the government.
This article focuses on a subset of the remaining federal and state
restrictions: those that make it impossible for certain categories of
alien workers, and in some instances migrant workers, to obtain ac-
cess to civil legal services for the poor. In an era of increasing restric-
tions on individuals' ability to seek legal redress against the govern-
ment, low-income workers are particularly vulnerable. When workers
cannot enforce their rights, employers can exploit them by paying
less than the minimum wage, failing to pay overtime, providing sub-
standard working conditions, or violating the laws in other ways. Part
I argues that, much as the "welfare challenge" restriction was in-
tended to insulate the federal government's welfare reform laws from
court challenges, restrictions on the ability of alien and migrant
workers to access legal services are intended to insulate the employ-
ment practices of certain employers from application of the applica-
ble labor and employment laws. Just as the "welfare challenge" re-
striction violated the separation of powers, the aliens and migrants
restrictions warp our system of justice and our regime of rights en-
forcement.
The restrictions, which apply to all funding received by a legal services program that re-
ceives any funding from the federal Legal Services Corporation [hereinafter "LSC"], are im-
posed through a series of riders enacted by Congress in connection with the annual appropria-
tion for LSC. See Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 107-77, Title V, 115 Stat. 748, 794-95 (2001); Depart-
ments of Comnmerce,Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,
FY 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762A-101 (2000); Department of State and Related
Agency Appropriations Act, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-49 (1999); Omni-
bus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112
Stat. 2681, 2681-107 (1998); Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 502(a) (2), 111 Stat. 2440,
2510-11 (1997); Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 502,
110 Stat. 3009, 3009-59-60 (1996); Omnibus Consolidated Recission Rescissions and Appropria-
tions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 504(a), 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-53-56 (1996). The rele-
vant LSC regulations are codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 1600-1644 (2000). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2996i(c)
(2003) (imposing certain restrictions on LSC and private funding, but not on state and local
government funding).
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Focusing on Virginia as an example, the remaining Parts discuss
the constitutional infirmities of two restrictions on legal services for
alien workers and migrants that are currently in effect, and of one re-
striction on legal services for alien workers that some legal services
critics have threatened to impose. Part II discusses the right to travel
implications of a ban on migrant legal services imposed on Virginia
state funding for legal services in 2001. Part III discusses the equal
protection infirmities of a restriction on providing legal services to
certain categories of legal aliens-copied from the restriction on le-
gal services provided by federal Legal Services Corporation (hereinaf-
ter "LSC") grantees-that the Virginia legislature came close to pass-
ing in 2000 and again in 2001. In the event that a legislator in
Virginia or any other state again proposes extending the federal re-
strictions onto state funding, it is crucial that legal services advocates
understand these constitutional infirmities. Finally, Part 1V discusses
the equal protection problems with a restriction existing in a number
of states, including Virginia, and also imposed on federal LSC grant-
ees-the denial of legal services to children of undocumented work-
ers.
I. RESTRICTING THE AVAILABILI1TY OF CIVIL LEGAL SERVICES
FOR ALIEN AND MIGRANT WORKERS IS BAD POLICY
An agribusiness hires two Spanish-speaking workers to work its
fields. The manager decides not to pay them, but he does not want
them to make a scene. So when they are done, he hands them each a
check with "VOID" written in the corner. It is not until the men leave
the premises and try to cash their checks that they realize they have
been tricked. If the men could get into court, they could use the
checks as evidence that the employer hired them and owed them
money. The employer does not care that he has left a trail, though.
He knows that the men are undocumented, are scared of being de-
ported, know little about the American legal system, and could not,
in any event, hire a lawyer. Although the men are legally entitled to
the wages that they earned, there is very little chance that they will be
able to enforce their rights.
4
The employer feels invincible because he knows how hard it is for
alien workers to enforce their legal rights. Undocumented aliens are
particularly vulnerable to workplace exploitation. Although they are
legally entitled to the minimum wage, health and safety protections,
4 This scenario is based on an event that happened in Virginia. See Henry Weinstein, Power-
ful Foes of Legal Aid: State Money for a Virginia Justice Center for Migrants Is Slashed After Business Pro-
tests. Dispute Focuses on Who Needs Government-Funded Attorneys, L.A. TIMES, May 30, 2001, at Al.
JOURNAL OF CONSTITU7IONAL LA W
and other types of legal protections, they generally find it almost im-
possible to enforce those rights because they are scared that if they
do so their employers will retaliate by reporting them to the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service.' The vulnerability extends to some
categories of aliens in the country legally, however. Aliens can be
vulnerable to exploitation because they lack the language skills to
navigate the legal system or seek help doing so; because they lack fa-
miliarity with our legal system and consequently do not know that
they have rights or how to enforce those rights; because they work in
jobs where they are physically isolated from other people, from peo-
ple who speak their language, or from advocates who can help them;
because they work such long hours that they find it difficult to reach
out for help; or because they are dependent on their employers for
their housing, food and other necessities of life.7  Some aliens are
particularly vulnerable because their employers have brought them
into the country and have the power to send them home at the least
provocation, or have sponsored them for citizenship and can likewise
stop their sponsorship if the worker complains."
5 See Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant Workers, the Workplace Project,
and the Struggle for Social Change, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 415-16 (1995) (noting that un-
documented workers are protected by the Fair Labor Standards Act, the National Labor Rela-
tions Act [hereinafter "NLRA"], employment discrimination statutes, and workers' compensa-
tion regimes).
Last year, the Supreme Court reaffirmed an earlier ruling that undocumented workers are
protected 1y the NLRA. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 144-45
(2002) (citing Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 892 (1984)). See also Memorandum From
Arthur F. Rosenfeld, National Labor Relations Board General Counsel, to All Regional Direc-
tors et al., Procedures and Jemedies for Discrimninatees Who May Be Undocumented Aliens After Hoffinan
Plastic Compounds, Inc. (July 19, 2002), available at 2002 WL 1730518 (N.L.R.B.G.C.). In Hoff-
man, the Court ruled that undoctumented workers are not entitled to back pay awards tinder the
NLRA, but that employers who violate the NLRA rights of undocumented workers may be sub-
ject to "other significant sanctions." Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 150-52.See William R. Tamayo, The Role of the I'EOC in Protecting the Civil Rights of Farm Workers, 33
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1075, 1082 (2000) (describing how fear of deportation inhibits undocu-
mented workers, or documented workers with undocumented people in their family, from en-
forcing their legal rights).
See, e.g., LSC, The Erlenborn Commission Report, 15 GEO. IMMI(;R. L.J. 99, 106 (2000) ("Be-
cause of their limited English languiage ability and isolation within communities, many aliens
are particularly vdnerable to exploitation by unscrupulous sales and marketing enterprises,
landlords and other business, and employers."); id. at 115-16 (discussing farmworkers' depend-
ence upon employers, fear of retaliation, geographic isolation, long hours, and lack of knowl-
edge regarding legal services); id. at 122-26 (describing workers' isolation and their lack of ac-
cess to legal aid); Lori Nessel & Kevin Ryan, Migrant Farmworkers, Homeless and Runaway Youth:
Challenging the Banriers to Inclusion, 13 LAW & INEQ. 99, 130 (1994) (discussing the case of a
farmworker client who was evicted from her housing for speaking to a legal services lawyer).
This is particularly trte with respect to employees in the contry on special immigrant
visas, such as agricultur-al employees on H-2A visas, non-agricultural employees on H-2B visas,
and household workers on diplomatic visas. See Andrew Scott Kosegi, The H-2A Program: How
The Weight of Agricultural Employer Subsidies Is Breaking the Backs of Domestic Migrant Farmo Workers,
35 IND. L. REV. 269, 288 (2001); LSC, supra note 7, at 117-19; Chistn Lee, Women Raise the City:
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Employers who hire immigrant workers may claim that they hire
aliens not because they want vulnerable workers but rather because
aliens are the only people willing to do the work. Whether this is true
for various sectors of the economy is in dispute."' More importantly,
the restrictions on access to legal services for alien workers provide
evidence that the vulnerability of alien workers is part of a conscious
system aimed at subverting our regime of employment rights. In fact,
the American Farm Bureau Federation and its state affiliates, whose
members typically hire large numbers of alien and migrant workers,'
are among the most vociferous opponents of legal services generally,
and of legal services for alien and migrant workers in particular."
Domestic Disturbance; The Help Set Out to Help Themselves, VILLAGE VOICE, Mar. 13-19, 2002, avail-
able at http://www.villagevoice.com/issues/021 l/lee.php (last visited Feb. 18, 2003) (discussing
domestic workers brought into the United States on special visas by diplomats); Martin Mbgua,
Working for Slave Wages: Diplomats' Household Help Are Toiling and Suffering for Pennies, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, June 10, 2001, at 13. Household and other workers whose employers are sponsoring
them for citizenship are in a similar situation. See Martha Davis, No Papers, No Rights, No Safety,
NAT'L. L.J., Feb. 22, 1993, at 15:
An undocumented woman from Russia working as a nanny in Minnesota was raped by
her employer. Because her employer was sponsoring her for a green card, she did not
leave the job and did not report the crime to the police. Similarly, a Chinese woman in
the New York area was raped by her employer. To prevent her from reporting the crime,
the employer threatened to cut off the sponsorship that he had initiated..J See generally Hearing on Agriculture Workforce Needs, Before the Subcomm. on Imigration of the
Senate Judiciary Comm., 106th Cong. (1999) (statement ofJosh Wunsch, Michigan Farm Bureau),
available at 1999 WL 306431 (F.D.C.H. 1999) (discussing a farm labor shortage in Michigan);
Michael Holley, Disadvantaged by Design: How the Law Inhibits Agricultural Guest Workers From
Enforcing Their Rights, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 575, 589 (2001) (arguing that the workers
who employers bring into the United States on H-2A immigrant visas are not necessary "to get
the crops picked" because farmworkers have a high unemployment rate even during the peak
growing season, and there is a surplus of farmworkers in the country); LSC, supra note 7, at 102-
03 (noting that agricultural employers assert that many U.S. citizens do not want to work in agri-
culture, while organized labor and farmworker advocates have contested this assertion).
10 In California, for instance, 62% of all agricultural workers are foreign-born Latinos, and
another 3% are foreign-born Asians. CALIFORNIA WORKING IMMIGRANT SAFETY AND HEALTH
COALITION, IMPROVING HEALTH AND SAFETY CONDITIONS FOR CALIFORNIA'S IMMIGRANT
WORKERS 6 (Nov. 2002) (citing D. Lopez & C. Feliciano, Who Does What? California's Emerging
Plural Labor Force, in RUTH MILKMAN, ORGANIZING IMMIGRANTS: THE CHALLENGE FOR UNIONS IN
CONTEMPORARY CALIFORNIA (2000)). Nationally, migrant and seasonal workers constitute a
large percentage of the agricultural workforce. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HIRED
FARMWORKERS: HEALTH AND WELL-BEING AT RISK, GAO/HRD-92-46, at 8 (Feb. 1992). Accord-
ing to some estimates, as much as 40% to 50% of seasonal farmworkers in the United States are
undocumented aliens. Holley, supra note 9, at 588.
1 See BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, HIDDEN AGENDAS: WHAT IS REALLY BEHIND THE
ATTACKS ON LEGAL AID LAWYERS? 5-10 (2001), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/
resources/atj.series/article7.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2003) [hereinafter "BRENNAN CENTER FOR
JUSTICE, HIDDEN AGENDAS"]; Alexander D. Forger, Address: The Future of Legal Services, FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 333, 340 (1998):
The Farm Bureau is by far the most powerful influence [among LSC's critics]. I think, if
Congress dared to do so, they would eliminate permitted representations of migrant
workers. The Farm Bureau, in its zeal to discredit LSC, alleges lawyer misconduct such
as extortion, blackmail, and the like. It does so because LSC is extremely unpopular in
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Since at least 1978, they have worked for the abolition of the federal
LSC, urging that in its stead the federal government issue vouchers so
low-income people can hire private lawyers.' 2 In arguing for the abo-
lition of LSC, the Farm Bureau has pointed to the advocacy that LSC
grantees perform on behalf of the migrant and seasonal workers its
members employ,' many of whom are aliens. Since at least the late
1980s, they have backed the imposition of restrictions on federal legal
services funding.'
4
The pressure has succeeded in diminishing substantially the abil-
ity of alien and migrant workers to obtain legal counsel to enforce
their rights. Since 1980, Congress has barred LSC grantees from us-
ing federal funds to represent undocumented aliens," and since 1983
it has barred them from using federal funds to represent even some
categories of documented aliens."' The documented aliens excluded
from eligibility include workers recruited and brought into this coun-
try by their employers under the federal H-2B visa program for non-
agricultural employees; individuals granted Temporary Protected
Status (granted to people from selected countries, like Honduras and
its efforts to enforce employment, housing, and environmental requirements to which
the growers are subject.
See also Douglas S. Eakely, Role of the Legal Services Corporation in Preserving Our National Commit-
ment to Equal Access toJustice, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 741, 742 (1997) (discussing "the most viru-
lent of our foes, the American Farm Bureau, which has consistently lobbied against any advo-
cacy on behalf of migrant farmworkers and their children"); Holley, supra note 9, at 613-15.
12 BRENNAN CENTER FORJUSTICE, HIDDEN AGENDAS, supra note 11, at 5.
13 In 1980, for example, the American Farm Bureau argued that LSC should be defunded
because, among other reasons, "Legal Services attorneys ... are soliciting business and stirring
up controversy particularly among migrant and seasonal workers." Letter from Vernie R. Glas-
son, American Farm Bureau Federation, to Peter Rodino, Chairman, U.S. House Judiciary
Committee (Apr. 10, 1980), in Legal Services Corporation Reauthorization: Hearing Before the House
Comi. onJudiciaty, Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and theAdmin. offJustice (1981).
14 See BRENNAN CENTER FORJUFICE, HIDDEN AGENDAS, supra note 11, at 6.
Ir. See Act of Sept. 24, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-9868, 93 Stat. 416 (1979) (making appropriations
for the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the judiciary, and related agencies for the
fiscal year ending September 30, 1980, and for other purposes).
H; SeeAct of Dec. 21, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-377, 96 Stat. 1830, 1874-76 (1982) (making con-
tinuing appropriations and for other purposes). Today, only aliens falling within certain cate-
gories are eligible for legal services from offices that receive federal LSC funding. Omnibus
Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-134 § 504(a)(11), 110
Stat. 1321 (1996). Those categories include lawful permanent residents; aliens who are spouses,
parents or unmarried children under age 21 of U.S. citizens and who have pending applications
for permanent residence; agricultural workers with H-2A visas (limited to representation on
employment contract matters only, such as wages, hotusing and transportation); asylees and
refugees; individuals granted withholding of deportation; refugees granted conditional entry
prior to April 1, 1980; women battered by their spouses, children battered by their parents and
women whose children have been battered by a spouse (limited to representation to prevent or
obtain relief from domestic violence); and victims of severe forms of trafficking in persons in
the United States. See id.; Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. 104-208,
§ 502(a) (2), 110 Stat. 3009, at 59 (1997) (containing the domestic violence exception); Victims
of Trafficking Protection Act, 22 U.S.C. § 7105(b) (1) (B) (2001).
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Nicaragua, which the U.S. has recognized as being in turmoil and
therefore unsafe); asylum applicants; parolees; special immigrant ju-
veniles (undocumented children adjudicated state dependents be-
cause of abandonment, neglect or abuse); aliens in exclusion or de-
portation proceedings; aliens who have not filed for permanent
residence but who are the spouses, parents or unmarried children
under age 21 of U.S. citizens; individuals on temporary visas (e.g.,
student visas); and others. 17 Since 1996, Congress has extended its
aliens restrictions to cover even the non-federal funding received by
LSC grantees.' The only exceptions to these restrictions are that LSC
grantees can use non-federal funds to represent aliens who are vic-
tims of domestic violence and can use federal funds to represent vic-
tims of illegal trafficking.''
States have also put various restrictions on legal services for aliens
and migrants. For example, Virginia prohibits assistance to migrant
workers.20  Texas, Virginia, and Washington State all prohibit assis-
tance to undocumented aliens.2'
Many aliens and migrants excluded from eligibility for legal ser-
vices assistance are unable to find legal assistance elsewhereY. For
example, in Arkansas and Wyoming there are no legal services pro-
grams assisting people ineligible for assistance from LSC grantees.
2 '
The unrestricted leal services program in Tennessee does not take
employment cases. The difficulty finding legal representation is
particularly acute for agricultural workers who live in rural areas
where there are few pro bono attorneys, and where the few pro bono
attorneys do not speak languages other than English, lack the re-
sources to conduct outreach to the workers, lack expertise regarding
17 See 45 C.F.R. § 1626 (2000) (listing aliens eligible for representation by LSC grantees);
Memorandum from Esther Olivarria CrIz to Marcia Cypen (Dec. 5, 1995), in 141 Cong. Rec.
H14182-06, H14201 (Dec. 7, 1995) (discussing people ineligible for representation by LSC
grantees).
Is See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-134,
§504(a)(11), 110 Stat. 1321 (1996).
19 See Victims of Trafficking Protection Act, 22 U.S.C. § 7105(b) (1) (B) (2001); Omnibus
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. 104-208, § 502(a) (2), 110 Stat. 3009, at 59
(1997) (containing the domestic violence exception).
20 See discussion infra Part II.
21 See discussion infra Part IV.
2 LSC, supra note 7, at 135.
23 Arkansas Legal Services, Arkansas Legal Services' Response to Program Letter 2000-7, at 3 (Sept.
13, 2002) available at http://www.rin.lsc.gov/Stplns/Arkansas%2Self%20Evaltation%
20Report.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2003); Letter from Janet Millard, Director, Wyoming Legal
Services, to LSC 13 (Apr. 16, 2002), available at http://www.rin.lsc.gov/Stplns/Wyoming%20
Self%20Evaltiation%20Report.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2003).
24 Letter from Douglas A. Blaze, Tennessee Alliance for Legal Services, to Randi Youells,
LSC 13 (Sept. 20, 2001) (on file with authors).
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legal issues often faced by the workers, and represent agricultural
employers and thus are conflicted out of representing workers.
25
Attempts to deprive immigrant workers of access to counsel are
not limited to restrictions on who lawyers can help-some employers
also try to prevent legal services lawyers from entering their premises
to talk to workers.2 This is a particular problem for farmworkers and
domestic workers, who often live On the employer's premises.2 7 Hu-
man Rights Watch has reported that employers who recruit foreign
workers and bring them into North Carolina on special H-2A immi-
grant visas have used the local sheriff to scare away legal services law-
yers the workers had called.28  Likewise, farmers in New York have
threatened to physically harm farmworker advocates or to have them
arrested, and have physically blocked them from entering the work-
ers' housing areas. The many reported cases holding that employ-
ers cannot bar legal services lawyers from their premises make clear
30that the North Carolina and New York employers are not unique.
Some employers have also tried other tactics to prevent their
workers from seeking legal assistance, such as maintaining blacklists
of workers who talk to legal services lawyers."' Testimony to LSC's Er-
lenborn Commission in 1999 established that agricultural employers
and the employers' recruiters in North Carolina, Virginia, and Flor-
ida maintain such blacklists. 32 Some employers specifically warn their
workers that if they talk to legal services lawyers they will be black-
listed, and employers who have brought their workers into the coun-
try on temporary work visas sometimes send the employees home in
retaliation for talking to lawyers. Employers have also required their
workers to destroy "Know Your Rights" manuals distributed by legal
services lawyers,"" confiscated mail sent from legal services lawyers to
25 LSC, supra note 7, at 131-34, 136-37.
26 Id. at 125.
27 Nessel & Ryan, supra note 7, at 126.
28 See Holley, supra note 9, at 597 (citing HUMAN RIGHTs WATCH, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE:
WORKERS' FREEDOM OF AssOcIATION IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGITS STANDARDS 146, 147-48 (2000)).
29 Nessel & Ryan, supra note 7, at 129.
M See, e.g., Petersen v. Talisman Sugar Corp., 478 F.2d 73, 82 (5th Cir. 1973); State v. Shack,
277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971).
31 Holley, supra note 9, at 596-97.
s2 LSC, supra note 7, at 119-20.
3:1 Id. at 199:
H-2A aliens' fear of retaliation stems from observing punitive measures taken against fel-
low workers or from being told by the employer or the employer's agent not to talk to
legal services. The relationship between H-2A workers' unwillingness to complain and
their bonded status is illustrated by the fact that when the possibility arose that Florida H-
2A sugar industry workers may be able to remain permanently in the United States and
work anywhere in the U.S., the number of workers willing to complain to legal services
significantly increased.
34 Holley, supra note 9, at 597.
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their clients,35 and warned workers that legal services lawyers are their
enemies and could even physically harm workers. 6
These facts suggest the existence of a regime where employers can
hire immigrant and migrant workers-and sometimes recruit them
and bring them into this country too-knowing that those workers
are virtually powerless to enforce their legal rights. There are several
problems with this. First, it is a basic tenet of our legal system that the
legal system works best when all parties are represented. Although it
is unclear how far the right to counsel in civil cases extends,3 v the fed-
eral government and many state governments have recognized that
providing counsel to indigent people in such cases is essential to en-
sure that the legal system functions fairly. For example, in creating
the federal LSC in 1974, Congress declared,
[T]here is a need to provide equal access to the system ofjustice in our
Nation for individuals who seek redress of grievances .... providing legal
assistance to those who face an economic barrier to adequate counsel will
serve best the ends ofjustice .... for many of our citizens, the availability
of legal services has reaffirmed faith in our government and laws.
It has, of course, never been the case that everyone who needs
counsel in a civil case is able to get it. But the presumption has been
that the unavailability of counsel is the unfortunate result of inade-
quate finding, and is viewed as an inevitability in a regime where so
many social services needs compete for scarce tax dollars. The fact
that the exclusion of aliens and migrant workers from eligibility for
legal services results, at least in part, from pressure brought to bear by
the workers' employers-their legal adversaries-subverts this belief.
As David Luban argues, "taking out your adversary's lawyers is dirty
35 LSC, supra note 7, at 124.
36 Id. at 124-25. Lori Nessel reports that when she worked for Farmworker Legal Services of
New York, a farmworker asked her "if it was true that we had killed farmworkers. He said that
the grower had told the farmworkers not to speak with anyone from legal services because 'you
come onto the farms talking to workers and then take them away and kill them."' Nessel &
Ryan, supra note 7, at 100.
37 See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (requiring a case-by-case determina-
tion regarding whether the Due Process Clause requires a right to counsel in cases involving the
termination of parental rights).
.3 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (1974). Likewise, in creating the New York Interest on Lawyer Account
Fund, the New York legislature declared that "the availability of civil legal services to poor per-
sons is essential to the due administration of justice." N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 97-v (McKinney
2001) (Historical & Statutory Notes) (quoting 1983 N.Y. LAwS 659, § 1). See also 30 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 765/5 (West 2001):
Equal justice is a basic right that is fundamental to democracy in this State, and the in-
tegrity of this State and this State's justice system depends on protecting and enforcing
the ights of all people .... Not-tor-profit legal services organizations make a substantial
contribution to the expeditions operation and maintenance of the courts in civil
cases .... Equaljustice is an integral part of the general public welfare.
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law," where the adversaries try not to make the best arguments but
rather to simply silence their opponents.'
The exclusion of aliens from eligibility for legal services also sub-
verts our regime of legal rights enforcement. Both legal and un-
documented aliens in this country are generally entitled to the same
legal protections as everyone else.40 This stems in part from the belief
underlying the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment that everyone subject to the laws of this country should also
benefit from the protection of those laws."' Without access to legal
services, however, the legal protections that aliens have are often
meaningless. As Senator Schumer (then a Congressman) stated in
1986, arguing that agricultural workers in the country on H-2A visas
should be eligible for LSC-funded assistance,
[Y]ou can give people all the rights you want, but if they have no way to
enforce those rights, those rights are meaningless. We all know that INS
is terribly overburdened; we all know that the Department of Agriculture,
the Department of Labor are overburdened .... If we are not going to
have legal services, why kid ourselves? Why not just abolish all the laws
that are supposed to protect these folk; because if you do not have legal
services, the laws are unenforceable and useless.42
Extending legal protections to non-citizens also inures to the
benefit of citizens, because when only citizens are able to enforce le-
gal rights, there are incentives for employers to hire only non-
citizens, for landlords to rent only to non-citizens, and so on.'3  The
39 David Luban, Four Ways the Low Keeps Poor People From Cetting Heard in Court, LEGAL AFF. 54
(May-JIne 2002); see also David Luban, Taking Out the Adversay: The Assault on Progressive Public-
Interest Lawyers, 91 CAL. L. REV. 209, 211 (2003).
See upra note 5 and accompanying text.
See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 213 (1982). As Justice Field wrote in Wong Wing v. United
States, 163 U.S. 228, 242-43 (1896):
A resident, alien born, is entitled to the same protection under the laws that a citizen is
entitled to. He owes obedience to the laws of the country in which he is domiciled, and,
as a consequence, he is entitled to the equal protection of those laws .... The conten-
tion that persons within the territorial jurisdiction of this republic might be beyond the
protection of the law was heard with pain on the argument at the bar-in face of the
great constitutional amendment which declares that no State shall deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
42 132 Cong. Rec. H9867 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1986) (statement of Rep. Schumer), quoted in
L.SC, supra note 7, at 152 n.408.
: See H.R. Rep. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 58 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5662
("[A]pplication of the NLRA [to undocumented workers] 'helps to assure that the wages and
employment conditions of lawful residents are not adversely affected by the competition of ille-
gal alien employees who are not subject to the standard terms of employment.'") (internal cita-
tion omitted); H.R. Rep. No. 99-682, pt. 2, at 8-9 (1986), rerinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5757,
5758:
[Congress should not] limit the powers of State or Federal labor standards agencies stich
as the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Wage and Hour Division of
the Department of' Labor, the Equal Employment Opporttnity Commission, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board, or Labor arbitrators, in conformity with existing law, to
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exclusion of aliens from eligibility for legal services has, however,
made a mockery of the equal protection of our laws and has created
precisely these types of skewed incentives. As Gregory Schell, the
managing attorney of the Farmworker Justice Project at Florida Legal
Services has explained, "employers' perverse response [to the exclu-
sion of undocumented workers from LSC-funded legal services] is to
make sure that they do not hire any documented workers."0
4
II. DENYING LEGAL SERVICES TO MIGRANT WORKERS
VIOLATES THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL GROUNDED
IN ARTICLE IV'S PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE
Legal services programs and their funders sometimes face intense
pressure from the agribusiness lobby and from other employers to
deny assistance to migrant workers. For example, in 2001 the Vir-
ginia Farm Bureau agreed to stop lobbying the state legislature for
the imposition of broad restrictions on Virginia's state legal services
funding only if it received a promise that the funding would not be
used to support legal services for migrants in employment matters.45
As a result, today recipients of such funding are barred from using
that funding to assist migrant workers.4" This outright denial of legal
services to migrant workers has serious constitutional implications,
particularly in the wake of the United States Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Saenz v. Roe affirming the right to travel.
To understand the incongruity between a restriction denying legal
services to migrants and the constitutional right to travel, it is first
necessary to understand the link between the right to travel and legal
47services lawyers. Shapiro v. Thompson, which established that, even
when there is no constitutional right to a benefit, government cannot
deny the benefit to migrants in violation of the right to travel, was the
remedy unfair practices committed against undocumented employees for exercising
their rights before such agencies or for engaging in activities protected by these agen-
cies. To do otherwise would be counter-productive of our intent to limit the hiring of
undocumented employees and the depressing effect on working conditions caused by
their employment.
See also Gordon, supra note 5, at 416 n.34 (citing others who make this argument); LSC, supra
note 7, at 104, 109 & n.69 (noting that agricultural workers brought into this country on H-2A
visas by their employers are eligible for representation by LSC grantees "to ensure that the em-
ployment of such workers would not depress the wages and working conditions of U.S. work-
ers").
44 BRENNAN CENTER FORJUSTICE, HIDDEN AGENDAS, supra note 11, at 11.
45 SeeJen McCaffery, Legal Board Drops Migrant Clients, ROANOKE TIMES, Jan. 31, 2001, at B4;
E-mail from Mark Braley, Legal Services Corporation of Virginia, to Marilyn Goss, et al. (Jan. 26,
2001) (on file with authors). The restrictions that the Farm Bureau had originally pushed the
legislature to impose are described in Part III, infra.
46 McCaffery, supra note 45, at B4; Braley, supra note 45.
47 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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first case brought to the United States Supreme Court by neighbor-
hood legal services lawyers." Shapiro was part of a strategy by some of
the first legal services lawyers to establish basic legal rights for their
clients who received government benefits.4 ' The strategy was re-
markably successful, establishing "[b] aseline rights of procedural and
substantive fairness" for low-income people.5  Even today, Shapiro
51
remains one of the most well known legal services cases.
Two decades later, in Saenz v. Roe,1'2 the Supreme Court breathed
new life into the right to travel doctrine and grounded it in the text
of the Constitution. The Court reaffirmed its Shapiro holding that a
burden on the right to travel is subject to strict scrutiny, and reiter-
ated Shapiro's observation that the Court "had long 'recognized that
the nature of our Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of
personal liberty unite to require that all citizens be free to travel
throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by stat-
utes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this
movement.' ' i The Court then found that California's two-tiered wel-
fare benefit structure, which capped new residents to the level of wel-
fare benefits granted by their former state of residence, violates this
long-standing right.
Despite these clear holdings, and despite the deep investment of
the legal services community in developing and safeguarding the
right to travel,just two years after Saenz the Virginia restriction deny-
ing representation to migrant workers in employment matters was
imposed. This finding restriction, which made it virtually impossible
for the approximately 10,000 migrant workers in Virginia to obtain
legal services in such cases ,' flies in the face of the precedents set by
both Shapiro and Saenz.
In Shapiro, the Court held that three state statutes denying welfare
benefits to new state residents violated their right to travel. Although
the Court found it unnecessary to identify the specific constitutional
source of the right, it recounted its historical recognition of the right
to travel and decisions grounding the right in various constitutional
48 King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968), was the first argued by a legal services backup center,
)ut Shapiro was the first argued by lawyers from neighborhood offices. MARTHA F. DAVIS,
BRUTAL NEEI): LAWYERS AND TIE WELFARE RIGIITS MOVEMENT, 1960-1973, at 76-77 (1993).
49 See generally DAVIS, supra note 48, at 142 (noting that legal services lawyers collaborated
with recipient activists).
r" Id. (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618; King, 392 U.S.
309).
51 See Matthew Diller, The New Localism in Welfare Advocacy, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 413,
414 (2000) (citing Shapiro as one of "the most well known cases brought by poverty lawyers").
52 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
5Id. at 499 (quoting Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629).
54 McCaffery, snpra note 45, at B4.
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provisions. "5  In Saenz, the Court expanded on Shapiro, identifying
three specific components of the right to travel: (1) the right of a citi-
zen of one state to enter and leave another state; (2) the right to be
treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when
temporarily in the second state; and (3) the right to be treated like
other citizens of that state for those travelers who elect to become
permanent residents. " The Court declined to identify any textual ba-
sis for the first component, suggesting rather that the right to enter
and leave another state may simply be "a necessary concomitant of
the stronger Union the Constitution created. ''5' The Court grounded
the second component of the right to travel in the Privileges and
Immunities Clause contained in Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitu-
tion. '5 The third component the Court found "plainly identified" in
the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause .5 ' Hav-
ing found that California's two-tiered welfare law violated this third
component of the right to travel, the Court applied strict scrutiny.
It is the second component of the right to travel-grounded in
Article IV, Section 2's Privileges and Immunities Clause-that is
compromised by restrictions on legal services for migrant workers.
That clause states: "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several states." Its pur-
pose is set forth in Paul v. Virginia:"'
It was undoubtedly the object of the clause ... to place the citizens of
each State upon the same footing with citizens of other States, so far as
the advantages resulting from citizenship in those States are concerned.
It relieves them from the disabilities of alienage in other States; it inhibits
55 Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 630. The Court cited the following cases as grounding the right to
travel in the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, § 2: Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12
Wall.) 418, 430 (1871); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1869); Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F.
Cas. 546, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1825) (No. 3230). The Court cited Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160,
181, 183-85 (1941) (Douglas &Jackson, J.J., concurring separately), as grounding the right to
travel in the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, the Court
cited Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849), as grounding the right in the Commerce
Clause. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 630 n.8.
56 Saenz, 526 U.S. at 500-03.
57 Id. at 501 (quoting United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 748 (1966)).
58 Id.
59 Id. at 503.
CO The Saenz Court grounded the right to travel at issue in that case in the Fourteenth
Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause because there was no dispute that the plaintiff
class consisted of newly arrived residents of the state of California; the state subjected different
classes of state residents to differential treatment. See id. at 505. In contrast, here, hy definition,
migrant workers are most likely not residents of Virginia. Most have entered the state solely for
the purpose of obtaining work, and have no intention of remaining in the state. Accordingly,
the denial of legal services to these individuals does not amount to differential treatment of
state residents, and the right to travel grounded in the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, as identified in Saenz, is probably not implicated.
G1 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869).
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discriminating legislation against them by other States; it gives them the
right of free ingress into other States, and egress from them; it insures to
them in other States the same freedom possessed by the citizens of those
states in the acquisition and enjoyment of property and in the pursuit of
happiness; and it secures to them in other States the equal protection of
their laws.6
The Privileges and Immunities Clause has long been understood
to protect against discrimination against nonresidents "seeking to ply
their trade, practice their occupation, or pursue a common calling
with the State."'3 As the Court noted in Hicklin v. Orbeck, Article IV's
Privileges and Immunities Clause ensures that "a resident of one
State is constitutionally entitled to travel to another State for pur-
poses of employment free from discriminato ry restrictions in favor of
state residents imposed by the other State."" States may treat non-
residents differently only where there is "'something to indicate that
non-citizens constitute a peculiar source of the evil at which the [dis-
criminatory] statute is aimed,"' such that there is a "'reasonable rela-
tionship between the danger represented by non-citizens, as a class,




Clearly, then, this Clause calls into question the constitutionality
of restrictions on legal services for migrant workers, at least as they
pertain to migrant farmworkers who are also United States citizens."i
By denying legal services only to migrant workers-a class of workers
who by definition are mostly nonresidents-but not to other, resi-
dent, workers, the restriction treats the workers as "unfriendly
alien [s]" '"7 when temporarily in Virginia. Moreover, by defining the
class by the nature of their work, the Clause discriminates against
nonresidents seeking to "practice their occupation,"'8s namely by frus-
trating their efforts to protect themselves from exploitation in the
workplace.
There are two ways that the Virginia migrants restriction could
overcome Article [V's prohibition on this type of discrimination.
First, the restriction could be justified according to the analysis out-
,;2 Id. at 180.
63 Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 524 (1978).
64 Id. at 525 (citing Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1871)).
(I, Id. at 526 (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 398-99 (1948)).
6 The protections of Article IV's Privileges and Immunities Clause extend only to citizens.
See Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78 n. 12 (1976) (providing examples of statutes distinguishing
between citizens and aliens). See also Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 73 n.3 (1982) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (explaining that the Clause's use of "citizen" does not include aliens and thus
prohibition of discrimination against aliens must be found in other constitutional provisions).
This limitation is, of course, a significant one, as the majority of migrant farmworkers may not,
in fact, be U.S. citizens. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
67 Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999).
69 Hicklin, 437 U.S. at 524.
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lined in Hicklin. Specifically, the legal services restriction would have
to be aimed at remedying a "peculiar source of evil" constituted by
migrant workers. Yet, the State would be hard-pressed to articulate a
legitimate "source of evil" that the restriction seeks to remedy. As in
Saenz, it is unlikely that there is some type of "magnet" theory at work,
i.e. that migrant workers are attracted to Virginia for the purpose of
obtaining legal services. ' In fact, the case would be even more diffi-
cult to make than in Saenz, because it is implausible that people
would move to Virginia for the purpose of subjecting themselves to
legal wrongs so that they may then seek legal redress. Moreover, as
the Court held in Shapiro and reaffirmed in Saenz, a state may not pe-
nalize needy persons migrating to a new state by denying them bene-
fits, even if their reason for traveling to the new state was to seek
benefits."0 Likewise, it seems implausible that the State would con-
sider the provision of legal services to a traditionally exploited class of
workers to be a source of evil in need of a remedy. Even if migrant
workers were, in fact, the "evil" targeted by the restriction, there is no
substantial relationship between the provision and the problem, as it
is unlikely that denying legal services to such workers will dissuade
them from entering the state: many of them are recruited by their
employers to work in the state, and many do not know of their legal
rights, or lack thereof, prior to arriving.
The second argument that could be made to distinguish the legal
services restrictions from Saenz rests on an interpretation of that
case's approval of the continued validity of bona fide residency re-
quirements. Specifically, if Saenz approves of bona fide residency re-
quirements when legal services and other services for the poor are at
issue, the state may not be restricted by the Privileges and Immunities
Clause protections.' A line of cases does, in fact, uphold residency
requirements for certain benefits, such as in-state university tuition.
For example, in Martinez v. Bynum," the Court held that a bona fide
residency requirement is permissible when the requirement furthers
a substantial state interest in assuring that services provided for its
residents are enjoyed only by residents.7' In that case, the Court held
that Texas could deny free public schooling to a child who had been
physically present in the district, but who was determined to be living
in the district for the sole purpose of getting a free public education.
The Court, defining residency as requiring both physical presence
69 See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 504-05.
70 See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 505; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 632 (1969).
7 See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 503-04.
72 461 U.S. 321 (1983).
73 Id. at 328.
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and an intention to remain, held this to be a bona fide residency re-
quirement.74
Similarly, it may be argued that restrictions on legal services for
migrant workers are merely bona fide residency requirements. Mi-
grant workers by definition have no intention of remaining in their
host state, as they generally enter a state only for the purpose of ob-
taining employment. Thus, one could argue that the restriction is in-
tended to ensure that state legal services are reserved for a state's own
residents.
Unlike in the case of true bona fide residency requirements, how-
ever, the legal services restriction does not appear to single out mi-
grant workers because they are non-residents, thereby preserving le-
gal services for in-state residents only. As the Court recognized in
Martinez, bona fide residency requirements are valid when they re-
quire that a person establish residence before taking benefits: "A
bona fide residence requirement simply requires that the person
does establish residence before demanding the services that are re-
stricted to residents. 75 Here, the Virginia restriction is not aimed at
ensuring that persons first establish in-state residency. Rather, the re-
striction appears simply to discriminate against one class of out-of-
state residents, migrant workers, regardless of whether they ever in-
tend to or do in fact become state residents.
Regardless, Saenz indicates that the provision of legal services may,
in fact, fall outside this analysis altogether.' In Saenz, the Court con-
sidered those "bona fide residency" cases in which it had held that
states may charge higher tuition or deny public schooling to non-
residents, and made a clear distinction between persons who are
seeking welfare benefits and students seeking education:
[B]ecause whatever [welfare] benefits they receive will be consumed
while they remain in California, there is no danger that recognition of
their claim will encourage citizens of other States to establish residency
for just long enough to acquire some readily portable benefit, such as a
divorce or a college education, that will be enjoyed after they return to
their original domicile. 7
In short, the Saenz Court clearly distinguished non-portable wel-
fare benefits from the more portable benefits that may motivate indi-
viduals to move to a state. Similarly, while migrant workers may, in-
71 Id. at 330. See aLo Starns v. Malkerson, 401 U.S. 985 (1971) (summarily affirming a deci-
sion allowing Minnesota to make in-state tuition available only to students who had been in-
state residents for at least one year).
75 Martinez, 461 U.S. at 329.
76 Saenz thus casts doubt on the constitutionality of another existing legal services restriction:
Iowa's Poverty Grant Program, which restricts eligibility for legal services to residents of the
state. See IOWA CODIE ANN. § 13.34 (West 2002).
77 Saen z, 526 U.S. at 505.
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deed, travel to their host state for the purpose of obtaining work, it
strains credulity to argue that they travel to the state in order to avail
themselves of the legal services of the state. Rather, these workers
find themselves in need of legal services in order to challenge the ex-
ploitation they may face once in the host state. The analogy to welfare
benefits-which also address a need arising in the host state-is
strong, and thus legal services restrictions on migrant workers are
likely outside the bona fide residency exception to the protections of-
fered by the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
Thus, the Privileges and Immunities protections offered by Article
IV provide a strong argument that the Virginia migrants restriction
violates the right to travel, as least for migrant workers who are also
United States citizens. It is worth noting, however, that the right to
travel violated by this legal services restriction may be grounded in
other Constitutional provisions, as well. Without affirmatively choos-
ing one, the Shapiro court recognized several sources protecting the
right to travel, including the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, the Commerce Clause, and the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause, as well as the simple understanding
that it is "a right so elementary [it] was conceived from the beginning
to be a necessary concomitant of a stronger Union the Constitution
created. "78 Saenz's grounding within the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV of the right to travel from one state to another
free from discrimination does not in any way conflict with Shapiro or
thereby necessarily supercede Shapiro's recognition of the multiple
sources for the right to travel. What is clear, however, is that by sin-
gling out migrant workers for exclusion from state funded legal ser-
vices in employment matters, the government discriminates against
one class of individuals traveling to a state for purposes of seeking
employment, long-recognized to be a violation of the fundamental
right to travel.
III. STATE LEGAL SERVICES FUNDERS' DENIAL OF LEGAL
SERVICES TO VARIOUS CATEGORIES OF DOCUMENTED
ALIENS VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION
Since 1996, when Congress imposed far-ranging restrictions on
the activities of legal services programs that receive any funding from
the federal Legal Services Corporation, M legal services advocates have
78 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631 (1969) (quoting United States v. Guest, 383 U.S.
745, 758 (1966)). See cases cited supra note 55 (cases in which the Court had previously
grounded the right to travel).
79 The restrictions, which bar legal services lawyers from participating in class actions, claim-
ing attorneys' fee awards, representing prisoners and many legal aliens, lobbying, and many
other activities, apply to the lawyers' private funding as well as their federal funding. Depart-
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been afraid that states would be tempted to follow suit.55 The fear is
that states will assume that the federal restrictions set some sort of
standard for the activities in which lawyers for low-income clients
should be able to engage."' Moreover, states may assume that if the
federal government has imposed the restrictions then they must be
legal. But, as this Part argues, at least with respect to restrictions on
certain categories of legal aliens, it would be unconstitutional for
states to follow the federal example.
In early 2000, and again in 2001, the advocates' prediction almost
came true when the Virginia legislature threatened to impose on re-
cipients of state funding for legal services essentially the same restric-
tions that Congress imposes on recipients of federal LSC funding.2
Like the federal restrictions, the proposed restrictions included bans
on representing clients in class action litigation, claiming attorneys'
fee awards, certain types of representation before legislative and ad-
ministrative bodies, and many other important types of representa-
ments of Commercejustice, and State, the judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,
Pub. L. No. 107-77, Title V, 115 Stat. 748, 794-95 (2001); Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and
Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 504(a), 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-53-56 (1996).
80 See David S. Udell, Implications of the Legal Services Struggle for Other Government Grants for
Lau ,eringfor the Poor, 25 FORDIIAM UR|. L.J. 895, 898 (1998) (warning that "while efforts to
identify alternatives to LSC funding... should be applauded, they likely will generate the same
kinds of restrictions that now govern LSC).
81 This argument has certainly been used by proponents of various restrictions. For exam-
ple, in support of a bill that would have imposed on recipients of Virginia state legal services
funding the same restrictions currently imposed on recipients of federal legal services funding,
see discussion infra Part Ill, a spokeswoman for the Virginia Farm Bureau said, "'We just felt all
legal services programs should be subject to the federal restrictions."' Pamela Stallsmith, Mi-
grant Workers Lose Funding; Va. Assistance for Legal Services to Be Cut Off RICHMOND TIMES-
DISPATCi, Feb. 14, 2001, at Al.
The Virginia Farm Bureau has likewise accused legal services lawyers who do not receive any
federal funding of using state funding to "circumvent the federal restrictions." Id.; see aLsoJen
McCaffery, Bill Would Limit Legal Aid for States Migrant Workers; Rules Could Block 'Justice.for Some
of the Most Vulnerable Workers in Virginia," ROANOKE TIMES,Jan. 28, 2001, at B1. This accusation
implies that the federal restrictions were intended to be a standard that applies to all legal ser-
vices lawyers, regardless of the source of their funding. However, since the federal restrictions
apply only to recipients of federal funding, organizations that do not receive any federal fund-
ing are not bound by the restrictions. It is hardly fair to accuse them of "circumventing" restric-
tions that do not bind them and were not intended to bind them.
82 See H.B. 1942, 2001 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2001) (imposing on state legal services
ftnding "the same restrictions placed on recipients of LSC funds as set forth in § 504 of the
Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996," with specific exceptions
regarding legislative and administrative advocacy, timekeeping and other administrative re-
qUirements, and helping victims of domestic violence regardless of alienage status). See aLso
McCaffery, supra note 81, at B1 (describing subsequent bill introduced in 2001 by Virginia State
Delegate Terry Kilgore); McCaffery, supra note 45, at B4 (describing Kilgore bill and a compan-
ion budget amendment); Pamela Stallsmith, Farmo Workers Measure to Get Further Study,
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 1, 2000, at A6 (describing a bill introduced in 1999-2000 by
Virginia State Senator Randy j. Forbes).
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tion.8" One of the most devastating restrictions would have limited
the categories of aliens eligible for legal services, making a wide vari-
ety of aliens legally in the country ineligible for state-funded legal ser-
vices a4  In particular, the several thousand workers recruited and
brought into this country by their employers under the federal H-2B
visa program for nonagricultural employees would have been made
ineligible for legal services at any office that received state funding.
s5
The restrictions bill passed the state Senate in 2000, and the fol-
lowing year, after it was reintroduced, it was widely expected to pass.86
Passage of the bill was avoided only when the Farm Bureau agreed to
a compromise in the form of the migrants restriction discussed below
in Part 11.s1 As this Part argues, if another state considers imposing
the federal restrictions on state funding, everyone involved in the
funding process should be aware that states lack the power to copy
the federal aliens restrictions."'
The Constitution grants the political branches of the federal gov-
ernment power over the conduct of foreign affairs and immigration
83 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
84 See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text (listing the categories of aliens eligible for
representation from LSC grantees). The Virginia bill would have barred state-funded legal ser-
vices from being provided to all categories of aliens ineligible for representation from LSC
grantees. Although the LSC restrictions contain an exception allowing victims of trafficking to
obtain representation, the Virginia bill contained no such exception. H.B. 1942, 2001 Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2001).
85 Virginia employers bring workers into the country on H-2B visas to work in the vegetable
packing, seafood and landscaping industries. In 2000, the over 250 Virginia employers who ap-
plied for H-2B visas brought 5,000 workers into Virginia from countries including Mexico and
Guatemala. McCaffery, supra note 81, at BI; Weinstein, supra note 4, atAl.
86 SeeJennifer Bier, Left Out in the Cold: Deal Costs Migrant Workers Their Counsel, LEGAL TIMES,
Feb. 19, 2001, at 1; Stallsmith, supra note 81, at Al (quoting Mark Braley).
87 See Braley, supra note 45.
The constitutionality of the other restrictions in the bill is beyond the scope of this article.
However, it is worth noting that in February 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down as view-
point discriminatory and violative of the separation of powers the federal restriction on LSC
grantees challenging welfare reform laws in the course of representing an individual client.
Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001). The imposition of this restriction by a
state would likely be unconstitutional as well.
Additionally, the proposed restrictions on claiming attorneys' fee awards and engaging in
class action litigation may violate the separation of powers mandated by the Virginia constitu-
tion, VA. CONST. art. Ill, § 1, although further analysis regarding the requirements of Virginia's
separation of powers provision is necessary. SeeAbel & Udell, supra note 1, at 896-903 (discuss-
ing the ways in which the federal attorneys' fee award and class action restrictions violate the
separation of powers required by the federal Constitttion, and suggesting that similar state re-
strictions may run afoul of similar state constitutional provisions).
Finally, one of the proposed restrictions-on informing potential clients of their legal rights
and then offering to represent them--clearly violates the rights of lawyers and potential clients
under the First Amendment to the federal Constitution. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 437 (1963); Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law Supporting Mo-
tion for Preliminary Injunction, at § IV, Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 985 F. Snpp. 323
(E.D.N.Y. 1997) (No. 97-Civ.-182).
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and naturalization.' The United States Supreme Court has ruled
that decisions by the federal government to grant or deny benefits to
aliens implicates these powers. ° Consequently, courts treat alienage
classifications created by the executive and legislative branches with
deference and subject such classifications to only rational basis scru-
tiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment."
State governments, on the other hand, lack the authority to regu-
late immigration, and their alienage classifications are thus afforded
no deference. State alienage classifications have consequently been
struck down under two constitutional theories. First, the United
States Supreme Court has held that states lack the authority to im-
pose any burdens on aliens other than those that the federal gov-
ernment has specifically contemplated.'2 Congress has not specifi-
cally contemplated imposing on all state funding for legal services the
restrictions it has imposed on recipients of LSC funding. In fact, to
the extent that there is any legislative history bearing on this issue, it
reveals that Congress believed that state governments and other legal
services funders would fund the representation of clients and matters
that the federal government declined to fund Consequently, states
89 See U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (empowering Congress to regulate foreign commerce); id.
art. 1, § 8, cl. 4 (empowering Congress "[t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization"); id.
art. I, § 8, cls. 10-11 (empowering Congress to declare war and to define and punish offenses
against the law of nations); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (empowering the Senate to advise and consent
on the appointment of ambassadors and the making of treaties); id. art. I, §§ 2-3 (naming the
President Commnander-in-Chief of the armed forces and empowering him to make treaties, with
the advice and consent of the Senate, and send and receive ambassadors). See also Michael J.
Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotty? Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism,
76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 494 (2001) (noting that although the immigration power is not specifi-
cally enunerated in the Constitution it is "universally recognized").
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976) ("[T]he responsibility for regulating the relation-
ship between the United Slates and our alien visitors has been committed to the political
branches of the Federal Government .... [D]ecisions in these matters may implicate our rela-
tions with foreign powers."); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952) ("[A]ny
policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in re-
gard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican
form of government.").
91 Diaz, 426 U.S. at 82.
92 See, e.g., Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1982) (enunciating "the broad principle that
,state regulation not congressionally sanctioned that discriminates against aliens lawfully admit-
ted to the country is impermissible if it imposes additional burdens not contemplated by Con-
gress"') (quoting De Camlas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 358 n.6 (1976)).
The relevant legislative history has to do with proposals to eliminate LSC, not restrict it,
but the underlying assumption that state governments and other funders will fill in voids is what
is relevant here. For example, in 1995 Congressman Robert Dornan (R.-Cal.) argued that
the absence of LSC-or its functional equivalent at the federal level-will not leave
women and children without access to the legal system. LSC-funded programs already
receive substantial resources from state and local governments, private entities, the
United Way, the NAACP and the ACLU,just to name a few.
Testimony Before the House of Representatives Judiciary Committee on Legal Services Reauthorization,
104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Rep. Robert K. Dornan), available at 1995 WL 446736
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lack the authority to copy onto state funding the federal govern-
ment's aliens restriction.
Second, the United States Supreme Court has held that state
alienage classifications are subject to classic equal protection analy-
sis.9 4  According to this analysis, if the classifications discriminate
against a suspect class or impinge on a fundamental right they are
subject to strict scrutiny. Aliens present within this country are a
suspect class, and alienage classifications are consequently subject to
strict scrutiny, because aliens are a "prime example of a 'discrete and
insular' minority."' Aliens can be shut out of the political process,
because they are generally barred from voting.'7 This leaves the pro-
tection of their rights and interests largely dependent on the judici-
ary. Additionally, aliens have long been the subject of invidious dis-
crimination, as is clear from the many United States Supreme Court
cases overturning state governmental attempts to deny aliens access
to employment or benefits.9t This, too, may make it appropriate to
treat aliens as a suspect class.'9 Additionally, as the Supreme Court
has repeatedly noted, aliens pay taxes and contribute to the economy,
and some can even be called into the armed forces, so "[ilt is appro-
priate that a State bear a heavy burden" when it discriminates against
(F.D.C.H. 1995). Likewise, in 1996, U.S. Representative Charles Taylor (R.-N.C.) urged a re-
duction in LSC's funding, arguing that "[t]he poor will not be denied free legal services," in
part because of the "millions of dollars of increases in interest on lawyers' for trust accounts."
142 CONG. REC. H8149, H8177 (1996).
94 Diaz, 426 U.S. at 84-85.
' 5 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982).
'6 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). This article discusses only those consti-
tutional protections available to aliens present in the country and does not attempt to assess
those available to aliens outside the country.
97 Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085, 1095 (N.Y. 2001). See also United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (noting that "prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searchingjudicial inquiry").
98 See, e.g., Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984) (state attempted to exclude certain aliens
from being notary public); Plyler, 457 U.S. 202 (state attempted to exclude children of illegal
aliens from public schools); Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977) (state attempted to exclude
certain aliens from state financial assistance for higher education); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717
(1973) (state attempted to bar aliens from admission to the bar); Graham (states attempted to
exclude certain aliens from public assistance programs).
99 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216 n.14 ("Several formulations might explain our treatment of cer-
tain classifications as 'suspect.' Some classifications are more likely than others to reflect deep-
seated prejudice rather than legislative rationality in pursuit of some legitimate objective.");
Mitchell Kurfis, The Constitutionality of California's Proposition 187: An Equal Protection Analysis, 32
CAL. W. L. REv. 129, 150 (1995) (noting that "a history of invidious discrimination" is a factor in
finding a group to be a suspect class). But see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S.
432, 445-46 (1985) (holding that a history of discrimination, immutable disabilities, and politi-
cal powerlessness are not sufficient to create a suspect class).
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them.' °0 Aliens consequently constitute a suspect class, and state gov-
ernment discrimination against them is generally subject to strict
scrutiny."°"
The Supreme Court cases holding that state government alienage
classifications are subject to strict scrutiny have involved lawful per-
manent residents.' Consequently, with the exception of the chil-
dren of undocumented aliens, 0 the Supreme Court has not yet had
occasion to determine the level of scrutiny applicable to state gov-
ernment classifications involving other types of aliens.' 4
However, the logic of the cases involving lawful permanent resi-
dents dictates that strict scrutiny also be applied to state classifications
involving at least some of the aliens that state versions of the federal
restrictions would exclude. 0  The Supreme Court has consistently
held that all aliens-even those in the country illegally-are people
for purposes of the Equal Protection guarantee of the Fourteenth
Amendment.'1 Like permanent resident aliens, all other types of
aliens are generally ineliible to vote and are consequently shut out
of the political process. Other types of aliens are as likely as per-
manent resident aliens to be the objects of prejudice. And, like per-
M In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 722; see also Aliessa, 754 N.E.2d at 1095 (citing these contributions
by aliens as a reason state alienage classifications are subject to strict scrutiny).
,01 Graham, 403 U.S. at 372.
102 See, e.g., Bernal, 467 U.S. 216; Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982); Nyquist, 432
U.S. 1; Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976); In re Griffiths, Sugarman v. Dou-
gall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); Graham, 403 U.S. at 367, 369. See also Wishnie, supra note 89, at 506
n.66 ("[T]he aliens in Graham were permanent resident aliens .... So too were the plaintiffs in
all but two of the subsequent Supreme Court decisions regarding local anti-immigrant dis-
crimination.").
104 Seediscussion infra Part IV.
104 See Wishnie, supra note 89, at 506 n.66 ("The Court... has not considered which level of
scrutiny to apply to state discrimination against thousands of other legal immigrants, from stu-
dent and employment visa holders to refugees and asylum seekers.").
In Toll v. Moreno, the Court struck down Maryland's denial of low in-state tuition rates to
nonimmigrant aliens, including holders of C-4 visas, but the Court's ruling rested on Suprem-
acy Clause grounds, not equal protection grounds. 458 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1982). The federal gov-
ernment grants G-4 visas to employees of certain international organizations and their families.
Noting that the federal government also grants a variety of tax benefits to G-4 visa holders as an
inducement for the international organizations to locate themselves in the United States, the
Court held that by requiring G-4 visa holders to pay higher tuition than other domiciliaries
Maryland was frustrating this important federal policy. Id. at 16.
Wr, See Wishnie, supra note 89, at 568 n.384:
[W] hile the current alienage jurisprudence does not extend clearly to legal immigrants
other than permanent residents, the rationale of Graham and its progeny would seem to
apply with equal force to other legally present noncitizens, who also work, pay taxes, and
often form extensive and long-term ties to their communities in the United States.
106 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210-15 (1982).
107 Kiyoko Kamio Knapp, The Rhetoric of Exclusion: The Art of Drawing a Line Between Aliens and
Citizens, 10 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 401, 405 (1996).
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manent resident aliens, other types of aliens can pay taxes,1s be gain-
fully employed, and otherwise contribute in important ways to our
economy and country. For example, many aliens, including those
who are brought into this country through guestworker programs,
are here to engage in work that most citizens are unable or unwilling
to perform. Other aliens help maintain communities that would oth-
erwise become depopulated and lose their viability."'"
There are several exceptions to the rule that state alienage classi-
fications are subject to strict scrutiny, but none apply to the denial of
legal services to certain categories of aliens. One exception is that
when the federal government acts within its powers to instruct the
states to treat aliens in a certain way in order to achieve the federal
government's immigration goals, a state alienage classification based
on those instructions will not be subject to strict scrutiny."0 However,
this exception applies only when the federal government has pre-
scribed a uniform rule for the treatment of aliens-it does not apply
when the federal government grants the states discretion to decide
how to treat aliens."' This is because although the federal govern-
ment's plenary control over immigration and naturalization permits
it to distinguish between aliens and citizens, the United States Su-
preme Court has held that the federal government lacks the "power
to authorize the individual States to violate the Equal Protection
Clause."' 12 Moreover, the Constitution grants the federal government
the power to "establish [a] uniform Rule of Naturalization,"' and the
Court has held that a "congressional enactment construed so as to
OS Aliens pay a wide variety of taxes, including but not limited to property taxes, sales taxes,
income taxes, unemployment insurance taxes, social security taxes, and Medicare taxes. Among
the aliens legally able to work-and thus likely to have taxes deducted from their paychecks-
who would have been ineligible for state-funded legal services under the Virginia bill are H-2B
workers, individuals granted Temporary Protected Status, some asylum applicants, and some
parolees.
10, For example, in 2000, Iowa's Strategic Planning Council concluded that Iowa's economic
and social health required Iowa to attract 310,000 people, including immigrants and refugees,
by 2010. Governor's Strategic Planning Council, Iowa 2010: The New Face of Iowa 10 (2000),
available at http://www.iowa20 O.state.ia.us/library/finalreport/finalreport.html (on file with
the authors). Likewise, the Task Force on the Productive Integration of the Immigration Work-
force Poptlation, created by the Nebraska Legislature, concluded that immigrants are "a neces-
sity" to Nebraska, because "[w]ithout these new workers and their families, much of Nebraska's
economic growth over the last decade would not have happened." Task Force on the Produc-
tive Integration of Immigrant Workforce Population, The Dream Lives On: New Immi-
grants/Opportunities for Nebraska (Oct. 2001), available at http://www.state.ne.us/home/
NEOC/edu/TaskForce.pdf (on file with authors).
110 Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085, 1096-98 (N.Y. 2001).
II Id. at 1096-98. See also Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (holding that a federal
statute authorizing "discriminatory treatment of aliens at the option of States" would present
"serious constitutional questions").
112 Graham, 403 U.S. at 382. See also Aliessa, 754 N.E.2d at 1096-98.
Il U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
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permit state legislatures to adopt divergent laws on the subject of citi-
zenship requirements for federally supported welfare programs
would appear to contravene this explicit constitutional requirement
of uniformity.""' 4 Congress has not instructed the states to deny their
own funding to any categories of aliens."' Indeed, given principles of
federalism, it is doubtful that Congress could do so.'" Therefore,
states cannot escape strict scrutiny by arguing that their aliens restric-
tions merely mimic the alienage restriction on federal LSC funding.
Under the "political function" exception, strict scrutiny is not ap-
plied to "exclusions that entrust only to citizens important elective
and nonelective positions whose operations 'go to the heart of repre-
sentative government."' 7  This exception is narrowly construed,""
and although it has been applied to exclusions of aliens from certain
government positions,"' by its own terms it is not applicable to exclu-
sions of aliens from public benefits.'2 0  Consequently, this exception
does not apply to state-funded legal services.
One other exception is that classifications involving undocu-
mented aliens are not subject to strict scrutiny.'"' However, as dis-
cussed below in Part IV, at least some classifications involving un-
documented aliens are subject to heightened scrutiny. Thus, this is
not a blanket exception validating legal services restrictions to certain
categories of aliens.
States' denials of legal services to certain categories of lawful
aliens are thus subject to strict scrutiny, which they would most likely
fail. To survive strict scrutiny, the classification "must advance a
compelling state interest by the least restrictive means available.'
2 2
14 Graham, 403 U.S. at 382. See also Aliessa, 754 N.E.2d at 1096-98. Some academics have
questioned the logic of applying the Constitutional requirement of a federal rule of uniformity
to public benefits programs, arguing that the process of naturalization does not clearly encom-
pass the administration of public benefits programs. See, e.g., Wishnie, supra note 89, at 533 (ar-
guing that despite the failure of the Graham Court to address "a number of important ques-
tions," the Court's conclusion that a federal statute authorizing state alienage classifications
would be unconstitutional is nonetheless "well warranted"). Nonetheless, Graham remains good
law. See Aliessa, 754 N.E.2d at 1096-98.
It, See discussion supra note 93 and accompanying text.
I. SeeAbel & Udell, sutpra note 1, at 902-03.
117 Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 221 (1984) (quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634,
647 (1973)).
118 Id. at 222 n.7.
19 See, e.g., Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982) (deptuty probation officers); Ambach
v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 75-81 (1979) (elementary & secondary school teachers); Foley v. Con-
nelie, 435 U.S. 291, 297 (1978) (state troopers).
121) Bernal, 467 U.S. at 221-22. See also Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374-75 (1971)
(holding that the public interest doctrine could not justify Pennsylvania's restriction of public
assistance to citizens, and Arizona's restriction of public assistance to citizens and longtime resi-
dent aliens).
121 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (1982).
122 Bernal, 467 U.S. at 219.
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The purpose of state legal services funding is often to provide equal
access to the courts.'23 But aliens' need for access to the courts is
generally greater than that of citizens, because aliens are generally
unable to enforce their rights or protect their interests by voting or
otherwise through the political process.1 4  Additionally, aliens are
more likely than citizens to be unable to protect their rights without
the assistance of a lawyer due to unfamiliarity with our country's legal
system, with their rights within that legal system, and with the English
language. 5 Another frequent purpose of state legal services funding
is to assist the courts by providing counsel.2"6 That purpose is dis-
served by denying legal services to aliens, many of whom are likely to
have limited English skills and to be unfamiliar with our legal system
and therefore to need the assistance of an attorney more than citi-
zens do. 2 ' Finally, to the extent that the purpose of the classification
is to save the state money, that cannot support the denial of legal ser-
vices to some types of aliens. As the United States Supreme Court has
noted, "'[a]liens like citizens pay taxes and may be called into the
armed forces .... [A]liens may live within a state for many years,
work in the state and contribute to the economic growth of the
state."""' Consequently, the Court has held, "the 'justification of lim-
iting expenses is particularly inappropriate and unreasonable when
the discriminated class consists of aliens. '" 2 ' Thus, a state restriction
on legal services for documented aliens is unlikely to pass constitu-
tional scrutiny.
IV. THE DENIAL OF LEGAL SERVICES TO UNDOCUMENTED
CHILDREN VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION
The federal government denies undocumented aliens access to
legal services provided by any office that receives funding from the
federal Legal Services Corporation, and Texas, Virginia, and Wash-
123 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
124 See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
125 See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 102 (1976) ("Aliens ... are often handi-
capped by a lack of familiarity with our language and customs."). See also supra Part Il.
126 See, e.g., N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 97-v (McKinney 2001) (Historical & Statutory Notes) (quot-
ing 1983 N.Y. Laws 659, § 1) ("[T] he availability of civil legal services to poor persons is essential
to the due administration ofjustice.").
127 See supra Part II.
128 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (quoting Leger v. Sailer, 321 F. Supp.
250, 253 (E.D. Pa. 1970)); see also Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 4 (1977) ("'Resident aliens,
like citizens, pay taxes, support the economy, serve in the Armed Forces, and contribute in myr-
iad other ways to our society."') (quoting In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722 (1973)); id. at 12
("Resident aliens are obligated to pay their full share of the taxes that support the assistance
programs. There thus is not real unfairness in allowing resident aliens an equal right to par-
ticipate in programs to which they contribute on an equal basis.").
129 Graham, 403 U.S. at 376.
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ington State all deny state-funded legal services to undocumented
aliens.s As previously discussed, undocumented aliens are benefici-
aries of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 3 ' The United States Supreme Court has reasoned that because
they have voluntarily entered the country in violation of federal law,
undocumented aliens do not fulfill the criteria for a suspect class,"'
but it has not established a general rule regarding what level of scru-
tiny should be applied to classifications involving them. Supreme
Court precedent, however, implies that at the very least the denial of
legal services to children of undocumented workers is subject to
heightened scrutiny, and that it cannot survive such scrutiny.1
3 3
The Supreme Court has recognized the need to protect undocu-
mented immigrant children from discrimination. In Plyler v. Doe, the
Court held that Texas' denial of public education to undocumented
children violated the equal protection rights of those children."4 The
Court noted that children of undocumented workers have little or no
control over their entry into this country. 35  Because Texas' discrimi-
nation was "directed against children, and impose[d] its discrimina-
tory burden on the basis of a legal characteristic over which children
can have little control," stated the Court, "[i]t is ... difficult to con-
ceive of a rational justification for penalizing these children for their
presence in the United States."'3 ' Moreover, noted the Court, depri-
vation of education
imposes a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children not account-
able for their disabling status .... By denying these children a basic edu-
'M See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 51.943(c) (Vernon 2001) ("Funds from the basic civil legal
services account may not be used to provide legal services to an individual who is not legally in
this country, unless necessary to protect the physical safety of the individual."); An Act to Ap-
propriate the Public Revenue for the Two Years Ending, Respectively, on the 30th day of June,
2003, and the 30th day ofJune, 2004, 2002 Va. Acts, ch. 899, item 41.A (approved May 17, 2002)
(stating court filing fees collected pursuant to VA. CODE. ANN. § 17.1-278 (Michie 2002) and
Interest on Lawyer Trust Account Funds collected pursuant to VA. CODE. ANN. § 54.1-3916 (Mi-
chie 2002) shall not be used to file lawsuits on behalf of "aliens present in the United States in
violation of law"); WASIi . REV. CODE. ANN. § 43.08.260(5) (g) (West 2001) (providing that finds
allocated by the state legislature and "distributed to qualified legal aid programs under this sec-
tion may not be used directly or indirectly for ... [r]epresentation of undocumented aliens").
See also supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
i3 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
132 SeePlylerv. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (1982) (rejecting the idea that aliens are a suspect
class).
1 Although legal services offices can generally represent documented children of undocu-
mented aliens, there remains a significant number of undocumented children of undocu-
mented aliens who cannot access legal assistance.
134 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219-20.
B5 See id. at 220 ("[T]he children who are plaintiffs in these cases 'can affect neither their
parents' conduct nor their own status."') (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770
(1977)).
" 3 6 I d .
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education, we deny them the ability to live within the structure of our
civic institutions, and foreclose any realistic possibility that they will con-
tribute in even the smallest way 
to the progress of our Nation.' 
;
Consequently, ruled the Court, the denial of a public education to
undocumented children "can hardly be considered rational unless it
furthers some substantial goal of the State.
"l
13s
The Court then held that the denial of public education to un-
documented children did not further a substantial goal."' , It did not,
for example, further the state's interest in "protect[ing] itself from an
influx of illegal immigrants," because "[t]he dominant incentive for
illegal entry into the State of Texas is the availability of employment;
few if any illegal aliens come to this country, or presumably to the
State of Texas, in order to avail themselves of free education.' 40 Nor
was there evidence that excluding undocumented children was likely
to improve the quality of education in the state. 4 ' Finally, there was
no evidence that undocumented children were less likely to use their
education within the borders of the state than were other children 4
Although the Supreme Court has not applied Plyler to other cir-
cumstances,'4 lower courts have. For example, in 2001, the Second
Circuit relied on the case to hold that the federal government's fail-
ure to extend to children of undocumented mothers automatic eligi-
bility for Medicaid, similar to that extended to children of citizen
mothers, violated principles of equal protection 4. Likewise, a district
court in California relied on Plyler when it noted that the denial of
health care services to undocumented children "appears to be in di-
rect conflict with federal law." 145
Moreover, the Court has applied reasoning similar to the reason-
ing underlying the Plyler ruling in other cases involving differential
treatment of children based on circumstances of their birth. Begin-
ning with Levy v. Louisiana,46 which involved a state statute prohibit-
ing out-of-wedlock children from recovering wrongful death damages
1,7 Id. at 223.
1.4 Id. at 224.
139 See id. at 227-30.
140 Id. at 228.
141 See id. at 229.
14' See id. at 229-30.
143 See Kadrnas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 459 (1988); Lewis v. Thompson, 252
F.3d 567, 591 (2d Cir. 2001).
144 See Thompson, 252 F.3d at 590.
145 See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 785 n.37 (C.D. Cal.
1995) ("declin[ing] at this time to rule on this extension of Plyles'), reconsidered in part on other
grounds, 997 F. Supp. 1244 (C.D. Cal. 1997). See also Doe v. Reivitz, No. 85-C-793, slip op. at 13-
19 (E.D. Wis. July 22, 1986) (applying intermediate level of scrutiny to strike down denial of
welfare benefits to children of undocumented aliens), cited in Doe v. Reivitz, 830 F.2d 1441,
1445 (7th Cir. 1987), amended by Doe v. Reivitz, 842 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1988).
146 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
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for the death of their mother, the Court has repeatedly struck down
statutes that penalize children based upon their birth status.'47 For
example, in New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, 14s the Court
held that New Jersey could not constitutionally restrict welfare pay-
ments to families in which the parents were ceremonially married,
finding that the state's rationale-the preservation and strengthening
of family life-did not justify discrimination against needy children
on the basis of circumstances surrounding their birth over which they
had no control.4
Most birth status cases decided by the Supreme Court have in-
volved discrimination against children born out-of-wedlock. But the
rationale underlying the rejection of less favorable treatment for non-
marital children than for children born to married parents requires
the rejection of less favorable treatment for children born to un-
documented parents than is accorded to children born to docu-
mented parents. In both cases, children are discriminated against
because of their status at birth, a status over which they have no con-
trol. In both cases, the result is that the government punishes the
child for the purpose of controlling the parents' behavior. The rea-
soning behind the protection against discrimination based on birth
status is the same whether the discrimination is aimed at the marital
or immigration status of their parents: birth status is an immutable
characteristic (like race or gender) over which the child has no con-
trol, and punishing children for the conduct of their parents in not
being legally admitted into this country is illogical, unjust, and un-
constitutional. 15
The denial of legal services to children of undocumented aliens
by state legal services funders and by the federal government is clearly
unconstitutional under these precedents. As in the "birth status"
cases, undocumented children are not responsible for their status.
147 See Trimble v. Cordon, 430 U.S. 762, 776 (1977) (striking statute prohibiting non-marital
children from inheriting from fathers); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (striking bar
to non-marital child's right to paternal support); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Stir. Co., 406 U.S. 164,
165 (1972) (right of non-marital children to workman's compensation award cannot be de-
nied); Glona v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. his. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 76 (1968) (striking bar to mother
recovering for death of out-of-wedlock child).
148 411 U.S. 619, 621 (1973).
149 Id. at 621.
IN) As the Court noted in Weber:
[I]mposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our
system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or
wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegiti-
mate child is an ineffectual-as well as unjust-way of deterring the parent .... [T]he
Equal Protection Clause does enable us to strike down discriminatory laws relating to
status of birth where ... the classification is justified by no legitimate state interest, com-
pelling or otherwise.
406 U.S. at 175-76.
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Like the children in Plyler and its progeny, undocumented children
seeking legal services are in this country through no fault of their
own, so any denial of legal services to them should be subject to
heightened scrutiny and must be justified by a substantial govern-
ment interest. It is difficult to conceive of a legitimate state interest,
much less a substantial one, that is furthered by the discriminatory
denial of legal services to undocumented children. Merely avoiding
paying for the cost of the representation of such children is not an
adequate justification, because saving money is never an adequate
justification for invidious discrimination; as the Court stated in Saenz,
a state may not achieve fiscal savings by discriminatory means.5 The
"magnet theory" justification fails here, as well: it is implausible to as-
sume that aliens enter the country illegally in order to obtain legal
services-to enter with such a hope they would have to also hope that
they will be subjected to legal wrongs while they are here, which does
not seem likely. 152 Nor can the government point to a legitimate de-
sire to ensure that undocumented children cannot enforce their
rights under law-to the extent that undocumented children have
legal ights, the government surely has an interest in ensuring that
those rights are enforced, just as it has an interest in ensuring that
the laws generally are enforced. Thus, the principles set forth in
Plyler demand that children not be excluded from eligibility for legal
services solely because of their undocumented status.
As this symposium makes clear, the ability of low-income people to
obtain legal redress is under attack on many fronts. Aliens and mi-
grant workers have become the targets of particularly harmful efforts
to limit access to legal services. Federal and state legal services re-
strictions focused exclusively on aliens and migrant workers violate
core constitutional protections, including the right to travel and
equal protection. Preserving access to civil legal services for aliens
and migrant workers ensures a balanced regime of rights enforce-
ment that protects against exploitation and holds all employers ac-
countable for their actions.
151 Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 506-07 (1999).
152 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
